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NOTE
THE PRESIDENTIAL POLYGRAPH ORDER AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: SUBJECTING FEDERAL
EMPLOYEES TO WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
On March 11, 1983, President Ronald Reagan issued National
Security Decision Directive 841 (Directive) designed to reduce the unau-
thorized disclosure of classified information. The Directive establishes
procedures to be followed by executive branch agencies in investigating
unauthorized disclosures,2 commonly known as "leaks." Specifically, the
Directive authorizes executive agencies to conduct polygraph examina-
tions of federal employees in the course of leak investigations. 3
President Reagan suspended key provisions of the Directive, in-
cluding the polygraph provisions, in February 1984.4 Nonetheless, sev-
eral factors indicate that the issues raised by the Directive have not been
laid to rest. First, White House officials state that the Administration is
I National Security Decision Directive 84 (Mar. 11, 1983), reprinted in The Presidents
National Security Decision Directive 84 and Department of Defense Directive on the Use of Poygraphs,
1983. Hearings Before the Legislation and National Security Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Goven-
ment Operations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1984) (exhibit B accompanying statement of Richard K.
Willard, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice) [hereinafter cited as Directive, re-
printed in Directive Hearings]. The Directive is also reprinted in President Issues Directive on Safe-
guarding National Security Information, 5 ABA STANDING COMMrITEE L. AND NAT'L SECURITY
INTELLIGENCE REP. 1, 2 (May 1983).
2 Directive, reprinted in Directive Hearings, supra note 1, exhibit B, 1 I.
3 The section of the Directive authorizing polygraph examinations provided:
The Office of Personnel Management and all departments and agencies
with employees having access to classified information are directed to revise
existing regulations and policies, as necessary, so that employees may be re-
quired to submit to polygraph examinations, when appropriate, in the course
of investigations of unauthorized disclosures of classified information. As a
minimum, such regulations shall permit an agency to decide that appropriate
adverse consequences will follow an employee's refusal to cooperate with a
polygraph examination that is limited in scope to the circumstances of the
unauthorized disclosure under investigation. Agency regulations may provide
that only the head of the agency, or his delegate, is empowered to order an
employee to submit-o-a-polygraph examination. Results of polygraph exami-
nations should not be relied upon to the exclusion of other information ob-
tained during investigations.
Directive, reprinted in Directive Hearings, supra note 1, 5.
4 See Reagan to Relent on Secrey Pledge, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1984, at Al, col. 1; Reagan
Shelves Requirement for Polygraph Tests, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 1984, at AI, col. 1.
Subsequently, National Security Advisor Robert C. McFarlane informed members of
Congress that "the Administration will not reinstate [the polygraph provision] for the dura-
tion of this session of Congress" but that "we . . . cannot foreclose future action along the
lines of NSDD-84 . . . ... Letter from Robert C. McFarlane to Rep. Patricia Schroeder
(Mar. 20, 1984).
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seeking a bipartisan compromise with Congress on the problems involv-
ing leak investigations.5 Therefore, Congress will have to consider the
extent to which federal agencies may order their employees to take poly-
graph examinations in the course of the investigations. Second, com-
mentators have concluded that election-year pressures6 and the
confirmation hearings of Edwin Meese 3d for Attorney General 7 may
have motivated the temporary suspension of the Directive. Thus, if
Reagan is reelected in 1984, the Directive might be reinstated. 8 Third,
although federal agencies are no longer obliged to implement the Direc-
tive's provisions, "each agency is free to enact their own version of the
President's. . .polygraph policies. . . ."9 Despite Reagan's temporary
suspension of the Directive, the question remains: To what extent may
a federal agency order its employees to take polygraph tests in the course
of leak investigations?
Polygraphs have been criticized since their inception in the early
1900s.10 Most federal courts have concluded that polygraph evidence is
generally inadmissible in criminal trials because of serious questions
about its validity."' In addition, the intrusive and intimidating nature
5 See Letter from National Security Advisor Robert C. McFarlane to Rep. Patricia
Schroeder (Mar. 20, 1984) ("[W]e would prefer to work cooperatively with Congress to de-
velop a mutually-acceptable solution to this problem."); See also Reagan Shelves Requirement for
Polygraph Tests, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 1984, at Al, col. 1 ("In place of the [Directive provisions]
• ..the White House now wants to negotiate a 'bipartisan solution' with Congress 'to the
problem of safeguarding classified information' '); see also Reagan to Relent on Secrecy Pledge,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1984, at Al, col. 1 (Directive to be withheld "while the Administration
tried to negotiate a compromise with Congress").
6 See, e.g., Democrats to Press Bills Against SecreCy Measures, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1984, at
A6, col. 1 (a motive for withdrawing the Directive "was 'to curtail a tidal wave of bad press
until after the election,'" according to Sen. Thomas Eagleton).
7 See, e.g., id. (further motive for withdrawing the Directive was "to remove a controver-
sial issue from the Senate hearings on the nomination of. . .Edwin Meese 3d. . . to be
Attorney General.'); see also The Censorship Directive, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 1984, at A18, col. 2;
Reagan Shelves Requirement for Polygraphs Tests, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 1984, at A12, col. 1 (Sen.
Charles Mathias had intended "to make the [Directive] an issue in the [Meese confirmation]
proceedings').
8 See, e.g., Reagan to Relent on Secreq Pledge, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1984, at A20, col. 4
(White House official "suggested that if the White House did not reach a compromise with
Congress, the President could reissue the order if re-elected"); Safire, Split Screen Candidate,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1984, at A29, col. I ("the prospect of Mr. Meese at the helm of Justice
[Department] in a second term sends the frisson that [the Directive] will be back with a
vengeance'). See also Letter from National Security Advisor Robert C. McFarlane to Rep.
Patricia Schroeder (Mar. 20, 1984) ("[W]e . . .cannot completely foreclose future action
along the lines of NSDD-84 if a legislative solution to unauthorized disclosure is not found.").
9 Representative Jack Brooks, quoted in N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1984, at A6, col. 5.
10 See D. LYKKEN, A TREMOR IN THE BLOOD 27-28 (1981).
11 Some federal courts have a per se rule excluding polygraph evidence. See, e.g., United
States v. Clark, 598 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1128 (1981); Conner v.
Auger, 595 F.2d 407, 411 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 851 (1979). See generaly Annot., 43
A.L.R. FED. 68 (1979). The trial judge has the discretion to admit polygraph evidence in
some circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Rumell, 642 F.2d 213, 215 (7th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174, 186 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Glover, 596 F.2d 857,
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of polygraph examinations raises questions about their use in the man-
ner contemplated by the Directive. This Note discusses the fourth
amendment implications of polygraph testing as authorized by the Di-
rective. It analogizes polygraph testing with other governmental inva-
sions of personal privacy that courts have held to be searches under the
fourth amendment and considers the degree to which a federal em-
ployee forfeits constitutional protections by virtue of public employ-
ment. This Note concludes that the fourth amendment requires the
head of a federal agency to obtain a warrant before ordering a poly-
graph examination of one of his employees. Finally, the Note suggests
possible remedies for an employee whose fourth amendment rights have
been violated. It is important to consider a range of remedies because
the protection customarily afforded by the exclusionary rule is of no
value when the government pursues administrative sanctions rather
than criminal prosecution.
867 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 860 (1979); United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349,
1360 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 923 (1976). In almost every case, that discretion is
exercised to exclude the polygraph evidence. Annot., 43 A.L.R. FED. 68, 72 & n.2 (1979). In
Marshall, for example, the Ninth Circuit noted that "a trial court will rarely abuse its discre-
tion by refusing to admit the [polygraph] evidence, even for a limited purpose and under
limited conditions." 526 F.2d at 1360. The Justice Department also "has traditionally op-
posed the use of polygraph examination results in criminal trials." The Bresident's National
Security Decision Directive 84 and Department of Defense Directive on the Use of Poygraps, 1983
Hearings Before the Legislation and National Security Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Oper-
ations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1984) (statement of Richard K. Willard, Deputy Assistant
Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice) [hereinafter cited as Directive Heanigsj.
The general exclusion of polygraph evidence in criminal proceedings is appropriate be-
cause its interpretation is highly subjective. See STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., PRIVACY,
POLYGRAPHS, AND EMPLOYMENT 9 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as PRIVACY AND
POLYGRAPHS]. Polygraph test results by themselves are not useful; the results must be inter-
preted by the test's administrator. Skolnick, Scientfx Theor, and Scientific Evidence.- An Analsis
of Lie Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694, 703-04 (1961). Thus, the conclusion of the examiner is not
purely objective. Technicians cannot definitively certify that the subject is lying; they merely
form their own opinion of the subject's veracity based on the test results and other factors,
including the subject's demeanor and conduct. Thus, the examiner is required to make sub-
jective evaluations of the subject's credibility. See Skolnick, supra, at 704-06. The determina-
tion of a witness's credibility based on personal observation, however, is thought to be a task
entrusted exclusively to the jury. Because the conclusions of a polygraph examiner depend in
large part upon the examiner's assessment of nonobjective factors, polygraph evidence en-
croaches on the province of the jury, replacing the jury's determination of credibility with the
conclusion of a single person, the examiner.
Furthermore, many people wrongly believe that polygraphs can definitively indicate
whether a subject is telling the truth. This unfounded faith in the validity of the test causes
undue weight to be given to evidence that at best is merely a suggestion of a witness's verac-
ity. Directive Hearings, supra, at 24 (statement of Richard K Willard, Deputy Assistant Attor-
ney Gen., Dep't of Justice).
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I
THE DIRECTIVE
Although the Directive has been suspended, its provisions indicate
the kind of approach that government officials may pursue in handling
leaks. The following discussion will focus on the Directive, as a means
for exploring the issues raised by the use of polygraph examinations
under any approach to leak investigations.
The Directive was intended to protect "against unlawful disclosures
of classified information."' 12 Although the Directive was not expected to
eliminate all leaks, it was "designed to improve the effectiveness"' 3 of
the present security program and "reduce the frequency and seriousness
of unlawful disclosures of classified information."' 4 The Directive estab-
lished various procedures to protect against unauthorized disclosures.' 5
This Note focuses only on the section that authorized polygraph
examinations.
The Directive authorized polygraph testing of all employees of fed-
eral agencies and departments who have access to classified informa-
tion. 16 This authorization extended to over two and one-half million
12 Directive, repirinted in Directive Hearings, supra note 1, 1; see National Security Direc-
live/Access to Classifted Information, 1983 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Civil Service of the House Post Ojce &
Civil Service Comm, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1984) (statement of Richard K. Willard, Deputy
Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
Classified information is information that reasonably could be expected to cause some
degree of damage to the national security if disclosed. Exec. Order No. 12,356, § 1.1 (a) (3), 3
C.F.R. 166, 167 (1983). See generally ChehJudiial Supewirion of Executive Secrecy: Rethinking
Freedom of Expression for Government Employees and the Public Right of Access to Government Informa-
tion, 69 CORNELL L. REV. - (1984).
13 House Hearings, supra note 12, at 3 (statement of Richard K Willard, Deputy Assistant
Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice). The Reagan administration based the Directive on recom-
mendations of an interdepartmental group created by the Attorney General's office. Richard
K Willard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, was the chairman of the group, which in-
cluded delegates of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretaries of the Treasury,
State, Defense, and Energy. Id at 1.
14 Id at4.
15 One controversial section of the Directive required that persons with access to highly
classified information sign an agreement allowing prepublication review of any work they
publish. Directive, reprinted in Directive Hearings, supra note 1, 1. Congress delayed implemen-
tation of this section of the Directive until April 15, 1984. The Department of State Authori-
zation Act, Pub. L. No. 98-164, § 1010, 97 Stat. 1917, 1061 (1983), provides that no agency
head may "implement any . . . directive" before April 15, 1984, that would "require any
. . . employee to submit. . his or her writings for prepublication review." For a discussion
of this section of the Directive, see Cheh, supra note 12. Other sections of the Directive pro-
vided inter alia (1) that agencies must adopt policies regarding contacts between agency em-
ployees and members of the press that limit the possibility of leaks; (2) that agencies must
maintain records of investigations of disclosures; (3) that the FBI may investigate leaks as
violations of federal criminal law, see infra note 28 and accompanying text, even though a
criminal prosecution is not sought, with the results of the investigation available instead for
administrative sanctions. Directive, reprinted in Directive Hearings, supra note 1, 3.
16 Directive, reprinted in Directive Hearings, supra note 1, 5.
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federal employees-almost half of the federal work force-as well as to
the approximately one and one-half million employees of private con-
tractors with security clearances.1 7 The broad scope of the Directive
substantially expanded the federal government's use of polygraphs. 18
The Directive provided little guidance for implementing the poly-
graph testing program. It instructed the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment and all agencies dealing with classified information to amend their
existing regulations to permit use of polygraph testing in the course of
leak investigations.' 9 Under the Directive, an agency head or his dele-
gate had the authority and discretion to order that an employee submit
to a polygraph examination. 20 The Directive did not, however, limit the
circumstances under which a polygraph test may be ordered. 2'
Under the Directive, any employee who refused to take a poly-
graph test when ordered would suffer "adverse consequences" as a result
of his "refusal to cooperate" with the investigation.22 "Adverse conse-
17 Directive Hearings, supra note 11, at 2 (statement of Dr. Kenneth J. Coffey, Assoc. Di-
rector, Nat'l Sec. & Int'l Affairs Div., Gen. Accounting Office); see Lie Tests Backed by Justice
Dept., N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1983, at A17, col. 1.
18 In 1982, the federal government administered 23,000 polygraph examinations. Direc-
tive Hearings, supra note 11, at 1-1 (written report of Dr. John H. Gibbons, Director, Office of
Technology Assessment). The National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency
use polygraphs to screen personnel, and their polygraph use accounted for more than half of
the tests given in 1982. Other agencies use polygraphs mainly for criminal investigations.
"Federal agencies at present make only very limited use of the polygraph for investigation of
unauthorized disclosure of. . . classified information." Id at 1-2.
19 Directive, reprinted in Directive Hearings, supra note 1, 5.
20 Id
21 The report on which the Directive was based recommended several limitations on the
use of polygraphs:
The polygraph should not be used for dragnet-type screening of a large
number of suspects or as a substitute for logical investigation by conventional
means. It is most helpful when conventional investigative approaches have
identified a small number of individuals, one of whom is fairly certain to be
culpable, but there is no other way to resolve the case. A polygraph examina-
tion . . . should not include questions about life style that many employees
would find offensive.
Report of the Interdepartmental Group on Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Informa-
tion F-5 (Mar. 31, 1982) (on file at Comell Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Interdepartmental
Report].
These recommendations were not incorporated into the Directive. Instead the Directive
granted broad discretion to the agency head in ordering polygraph tests, limiting their use
only by a requirement that the evidence obtained through such tests not be relied upon to the
exclusion of other evidence in an investigation. Directive, reprinted in Directive Hearings, supra
note 1, 5.
22 Directive, reprinted in Directive Hearings, supra note 1, 1 5. The Directive instructed all
federal agencies having access to classified information to alter their regulations to "permit an
agency to decide that appropriate adverse consequences will follow an employee's refusal to
cooperate with a polygraph examination." Id Thus, the Directive itself does not explicitly
require such "adverse consequences." However, Richard K. Willard, the chairman of the
interdepartmental group that produced the recommendations on which the Directive was
based, has indicated that such sanctions are mandatory: "The directive provides that em-
ployees found by their agency head. . . to have refused cooperation with investigations will
1984] POLYGRAPH ORDER
quences" were defined as mandatory administrative sanctions which re-
quire at a minimum that the employee be denied further access to
classified information.2 3 In most cases, such denial would necessarily in-
volve demotion 24 because access to classified information is a component
of a substantial number of federal jobs.25 The Directive did not pre-
scribe other administrative sanctions beyond this mandatory minimum,
but neither did it preclude the possibility that an employee could be
fired for his refusal to submit to a polygraph examination. 26 Further-
more, although the results of polygraph testing were not to be "relied
upon to the exclusion of other information obtained during investiga-
tions" 27 in determining whether an employee has leaked classified infor-
mation, neither the weight to be given to polygraph results nor the
quantum of other evidence required to support the results was specified
in the Directive.
Federal criminal statutes also prohibit unauthorized disclosures of
classified information 28 and the executive branch of the government
may appropriately investigate and prosecute anyone who violates these
criminal laws. The government rarely convicts anyone under these stat-
utes because of "procedural barriers to successful criminal prosecu-
tion."29 Chief among these barriers is the government's concern that
successful prosecution may entail the disclosure of additional classified
information, either as part of the prosecution's proof that the defend-
be subject to mandatory administrative sanctions to include, as a minimum, denial of further
access to classified information." House Hearngs, supra note 12, at 3 (statement of Richard K.
Willard, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice).
23 House Hearings, supra note 12, at 3 (statement of Richard K. Willard, Deputy Assistant
Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice); see supra note 22.
24 Lie Tests Backed byJustice Dept., supra note 17.
25 See supra text at note 17.
26 See Directive Hearings, supra note 11, at 4 (statement of Kenneth T. Blaylock, President,
Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees).
27 Directive, reprinted in Directive Hearings, supra note 1, 5.
28 Various federal criminal statutes address the unauthorized disclosure of classified in-
formation. See 18 U.S.C. § 798 (1982) (prescribing prison terms and fines for anyone who
"knowingly and willfully communicates. . . or otherwise makes available to an unauthorized
person . . . any classified information"); 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1982) (prohibiting unauthorized
conversion of "any record, voucher. . . or thing of value of the United States'); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2277 (1976) (prohibiting federal employees from knowingly communicating classified infor-
mation regarding atomic weapons and nuclear materials); 50 U.S.C. § 783(b) (1976) (prohib-
iting federal employees from disclosing classified information to members of communist
groups or agents of foreign governments).
The report that formed the basis for the Directive noted that "[t]here is no general
criminal penalty for the unauthorized disclosure of 'classified information' as such," Interde-
partmental Report, supra note 21, at C-3, and recommended "the introduction of legislation
imposing a criminal penalty for all unauthorized disclosures of classified information by gov-
ernment employees." Id at C-14.
29 Interdepartmental Report, supra note 21, at C-7 ("[N]o criminal prosecution has been
attempted since Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo were indicted for leaking the 'Pentagon
Papers.'").
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ant's disclosures were damaging to the national security, or as part of
the defense's case.30 Furthermore, because criminal prosecutions "con-
firm the accuracy and sensitivity of the information that has been dis-
closed,"'3 ' agencies may prefer not to prosecute.
By authorizing administrative sanctions, the Directive permitted
executive agencies to circumvent the higher standard of proof required
to secure criminal convictions and to use polygraph results not generally
admissible in a criminal prosecution. 32 Thus, the directive was an "end
run" around the standards applied in criminal proceedings. 33 As such,
the Directive could have been a more powerful, yet less precise tool for
curbing leaks because less conclusive evidence would support sanctions
against an employee suspected of leaking classified information.
II
THE POLYGRAPH
Polygraphs measure and record changes in the subject's blood pres-
sure, pulse, respiration, muscular activity, and galvanic skin reflex.34
Polygraph examiners, or polygraphers, use the test results to assess the
subject's veracity.35 The polygraph's ability to detect deception is based
on the theory that "the act of lying leads to conscious confit,; conflict
inducesfear or anxieo, which in turn results in clearly measurable physi-
ological change."'36
In a standard polygraph examination, the subject sits in a chair
30 Id at C-8.
31 Id
32 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Detailed discussion of the use of polygraphs
in criminal prosecutions is beyond the scope of this Note, which focuses on the administrative
use of polygraphs. As a basic rule, neither the verbal statements made during testing nor the
test results themselves are admissible in a criminal action.
The Supreme Court has held that statements obtained from public officials during ques-
tioning performed under threat of dismissal cannot be used in subsequent criminal proceed-
ings. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 802-08 (1977); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385
U.S. 493, 499-500 (1967). A public official can be compelled to answer the questions, but he
must be granted immunity from criminal prosecution based on such answers as a condition of
the questioning. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977); Garrity v. New Jersey,
385 U.S. 493 (1967). These cases did not involve use of a polygraph, but statements made
during a mandatory polygraph examination would seem to be subject to the same restriction.
Furthermore, the test results themselves would not be admissible in a criminal proceeding.
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
33 See Directive Hearings, supra note 11, at 5 (written statement of Kenneth Blaylock, Presi-
dent, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees) (intent of directive seems to be "to scare employees").
34 J. REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION 4 (1966). "Galvanic skin reflex" or
"electrodermal response" is a change in the skin's conductance of electrical current. Id at
219-20.
35 Id at 3.
36 Skolnick, supra note 11, at 699-700 (emphasis in original). The validity of this theory
has been strongly questioned. See inra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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equipped with metal bellows on the seat and arms.37 The examiner at-
taches a set of electrodes to the subject's fingers,38 fastens a blood pres-
sure cuff on the subject's arm, and straps a pneumograph tube around
the subject's chest or abdomen. 39 The examiner then asks the subject
predetermined questions and the machine records the subject's physio-
logical responses.
The next step in the process is the source of the numerous doubts
about the validity of polygraph examinations. The examiner asks the
subject two types of questions: test questions-questions that directly
relate to the investigation at hand-and control questions-questions
"not directly concerned with the crime under investigation but that
[are] calculated to induce an emotional reaction." 4 By comparing the
subject's response to these two types of questions, the examiner infers
deception or truthfulness.41 The inference is questionable because a
"polygraph. . .detects excitement, not lies. Lying is only one of several
stimuli which may excite a person. Other stimuli which cause excite-
ment are fear of losing one's job, embarrassment, or anger at being ex-
amined." 42 These stimuli are highly complex, and yet inferences made
under the polygraph techinque do not reflect this complexity.43
Polygraphs can also be used as an interrogation tool to extract con-
fessions from subjects. Although this function is completely divorced
from the polygraph's purported ability to detect deception based on
physiological changes, many consider the extraction of confessions to be
the polygraph's most effective use.44 Richard K. Willard, the Deputy
37 J. REID & F. INBAU, sufira note 34, at 212. The bellows measure "movements and
pressures in the muscles of the arms and legs." Id
38 Id at 4. The electrodes measure variations in electrodermal response by passing an
imperceptible electrical current through the finger or hand. Id
39 The pneumograph tube indicates the respiration rate by expanding and contracting
as the subject inhales and exhales. Id
40 D. LYKKEN, supra note 10, at 31.
41 Directive Hearings, supra note 11, at 1-2 (statement of Dr. John H. Gibbons, Director,
Office of Technology Assessment).
42 Id at 2 (statement of Dr. John F.Beary, Assoc. Dean, Georgetown Univ. School of
Medicine).
43 Dearman & Smith, Unconscious Motivation and the Polygraph Test, 119 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 1017, 1019 (1963). The Office of Technology Assessment states that the "theory of poly-
graph testing is only partially developed" and that a stronger theoretical base is needed,
drawing "from the fields of psychology, physiology, psychiatry, neuroscience, and medicine."
Directive Hearings, supra note 11, at 1-7 (statement of Dr. John H. Gibbons, Director, Office of
Technology Assessment).
44 One commentator noted that "perhaps the major utility of the lie detector is its ex-
traordinary capacity for eliciting confessions." D. LYKKEN, supra note 10, at 22. A common
polygrapher's technique is to present the subject with an "opportunity" to confess, regardless
of the results indicated by the machine. See also Directive Hearings, supra note 11, at 5 (state-
ment of Dr. John F. Beary, Assoc. Dean, Georgetown Univ. School of Medicine) ("Because
most citizens are scientifically naive, some confess to things when hooked up to the polygraph
because they believe it really can detect lies."); id at 7-10 (statement of Dr. John Gibbons,
Director, Office of Technology Assessment) (National Security Agency and "possibly the
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Assistant Attorney General, stated in hearings on the Directive that
"subjects quite often make admissions ...in connection with a poly-
graph examination. This phenomenon may actually produce information that is
more useful in terms of the purpose of the examination than the examiner-s assess-
ment of the subject -s physiological responses. "45 The admissions obtained dur-
ing a polygraph test are the product of both the subject's belief in the
machine's accuracy 46 and the examiner's skill as an interrogator.
In a commonly-used technique for extracting a confession, the
polygrapher completes the examination and then expresses doubt about
the answers to certain questions, regardless of whether the machine has
indicated an unusual response to the questions. The polygrapher will
inquire whether there is some reason that the machine, has indicated a
reaction to those particular questions.47 The polygrapher may attempt
to convince the subject that "your story won't hold water," and "that it
is hopeless, he has seen through you, and you might as well as confess."'48
Thus confronted, people may make a variety of admissions, ranging
from minor concessions to complete confessions, in an effort to resolve
the supposed inconsistencies in the polygraph results. 49 Furthermore,
polygraph examinations are often highly stressful for the subject be-
cause, through this interrogation technique, 50 both the innocent and the
guilty are thus "informed" that the polygraph indicates they are liars
who have committed illegal acts.
Statistical estimates of polygraph accuracy vary tremendously de-
pending upon the type of questioning procedures used,5' the skill of the
examiner, the specific purpose for which the polygraph is employed, and
CIA" use the polygraph "as a technique of interrogation to encourage admissions" rather
than to determine truthfulness per se).
45 Directive Hearings, supra note 11, at 17 (statement of Richard K. Willard, Deputy Assis-
tant Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice) (emphasis added).
46 See Skolnick, supra note 11, at 704-05. The subject's belief in the infallibility of the
machine aids the polygraph examiner in two ways. First, the examiner's initial observation
and hypothesis of guilt depends upon the subject's attitude toward the machine; an enthusias-
tic subject is deemed "likely" to be innocent, because he believes that the machine will be
accurate and exonerate him. Second, the subject's belief in the machine heightens bodily
reactions; if the subject is dubious about its accuracy, fear of detection would be reduced,
which would lessen the bodily response. Id; see also PRIVACY AND POLYGRAPHS, swpra note
11, at 5.
47 D. LYKKEN, supra note 10, at 20-21. Professor Lykken teaches psychiatry at the Uni-
versity of Minnesota Medical School and is a long-time critic of polygraphs.
48 Id
49 This technique can be so effective that it leads to false confessions. Confronted with a
hard-nosed interrogator who emphatically asserts that the machine indicates the subject is
lying, the innocent subject's faith in the machine may actually lead him to doubt his own
memory and conclude that "it really looks like I did it." Id at 210-11, 213-14.
50 Id at 215.
51 Id at 149-50.
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the methodology of the study.52 There are two broad categories of poly-
graph use: narrowly focused investigations and generalized, wide-scale
screening.5 3 The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) evaluated all
available polygraph studies and concluded that, when used, in criminal
investigations, "the polygraph test detects deception better than chance,
but with significant error rates."' 54 The OTA found "no research" on
the use of polygraphs as a screening device, however. 55 It cautioned that
statistics based on the use of polygraphs in investigations should not be
generalized to the screening context. In the latter application several
factors may further reduce reliability to a point where fifty percent of
those responses identified as deceptive would in fact be truthful.5 6 The
Directive was not limited to small scale investigations; it "appear[ed] to
permit" the screening of a large number of federal employees in the
course of investigations into unauthorized disclosures.57 Thus, the Di-
rective may have allowed for use of the polygraph in situations where it
is the least reliable, i.e., as a large scale screening device.
Other studies have also raised serious questions about the reliability
of polygraph examinations. One investigator reports that polygraphs
may be accurate sixty-three to seventy-two percent of the time, but that
the likelihood of a truthful subject being diagnosed as deceptive is as
high as fifty percent.58 This figure has been confirmed by other re-
52 Directive Hearings, supra note 11, at 12 (statement of Richard K. Willard, Deputy Assis-
tant Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice).
53 Id at 11.
54 Id at 1-5 (statement of Dr. John H. Gibbons, Director, Office of Technology Assess-
ment) (review of 28 studies that satisfied its minimum scientific criteria showed correct guilty
detections ranging from 17% to 100%).
55 Id at 7-6.
56 Id at 7-7. This "false positive" polygraph results stem from the fact that few people
in the large screening sample are likely to be culpable:
If the percentage of guilty is small, say 5 percent (1 guilty person out of every
20 persons screened, or 50 out of 1,000), then even assuming a very high (95
percent) polygraph validity rate, the predictive value of the screening use of
the polygraph would only be 50 percent. That is, for each 1,000 individuals
screened, about 47 out of the 50 guilty persons would be correctly identified as
deceptive, but 47 out of the 950 innocent persons would be incorrectly identi-
fied as deceptive (false positives) .... For every person correctly identified
as deceptive, another person would be incorrectly identified.
Id at 7-6- 7-7.
57 Id at 7-6.
58 D. LYKKEN, upra note 10, at 125. Professor Lykken notes that few of the methods
used to assess the reliability of polygraphs have themselves been tested for accuracy. The
figures cited are based on the Lie Control Test, a widely employed technique that uses ques-
tions about the misdeed at issue along with control questions about past conduct. Id at 109-
27.
Polygraphers often claim that determinations of veracity based on polygraph tests are
95% to 99% accurate. Id at 65. Professor Lykken rejects these estimates, asserting that they
are erroneous because polygraphers rarely know whether their diagnosis is correct. Therefore,
these estimates are based on inadequate data, colored by the polygraphers' belief in the effi-
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searchers. 59 These results suggest that, at least in some contexts,
polygraphs are no better than a coin flip.
"False negatives," where deceptive persons are characterized as
truthful, may also occur. "False negative" results are aggravated by
countermeasures taken by the guilty person to escape detection. 60 The
OTA notes that "even a small false negative rate" could have serious
consequences if the polygraph is relied upon for national security pur-
poses, because "those individuals who the Federal Government would
most want to detect (e.g., for legitimate national security violations)
may well be the most motivated and perhaps the best trained to avoid
detection." 6 1
III
FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
A. The Fourth Amendment and Polygraph Testing
The fourth amendment protects against "unreasonable searches
and seizures. '"62 Extending fourth amendment protection to federal em-
ployees subjected to polygraph examinations thus requires an initial de-
termination that these examinations are "searches" in the constitutional
sense. Furthermore, constitutional protections pertain only to those
searches which infringe on an interest that the fourth amendment was
designed to protect.63
The following section argues that polygraph examinations are
"searches" under the fourth amendment. The section then analyzes
whether fourth amendment protection extends to federal employees
who are ordered to submit to polygraph testing. This analysis, which
balances the employees' interest in avoiding the warrantless intrusion
against the interests of the federal agency ordering the test, concludes
that the fourth amendment requires agencies to obtain warrants before
ordering polygraph examinations of federal employees.
cacy of the machine. Id at 64-68. See also Skolnick, supra note 11, at 699 (questioning one
study's conclusion that polygraphs have accuracy rate of 95%).
59 See, e.g., Horvath, The EJect of Selected Variables on Interpretation of Polygraph Records, 62 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 127-36 (1977).
60 See D. LYKKEN, supra note 10, at 237-43. Countermeasures may include techniques
such as biofeedback, muscle tensing, and other self-induced stimuli. Id.
61 Directive Hearings, supra note 11, at 7-11 (statement of Dr. John H. Gibbons, Director,
Office of Technology Assessment).
62 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The entire amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Id
63 See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
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1. PolHgraph Tests As "Searches"
At first glance, polygraph examinations may not resemble tradi-
tional searches. A closer look, however, reveals compelling similarities
between polygraph examinations and other governmental practices re-
stricted by the fourth amendment.
The fourth amendment protects our "interests in human dignity
and privacy" from searches involving bodily intrusions. 64  Admittedly,
polygraph examinations do not require penetration of the skin, unlike
blood tests;6 5 nor do they require the subject to remove his clothing,
unlike strip searches, cavity searches,,and searches to obtain pubic hair
samples. As a physical invasion, polygraph tests are arguably fairly in-
nocuous. Innocuousness, however, is not the constitutional standard for
determining what constitutes a search.
The fourth amendment protects an individual's reasonable expec-
tation of privacy from governmental intrusion.6 6 In cases involving var-
ious types of body searches, the courts have found that an expectation of
privacy is not reasonable where the evidence obtained has been subject
to constant and knowing public exposure. 67 In United States v. Dionisio, 68
the Supreme Court held that the required disclosure of a voice sample
was not protected by the fourth amendment because "[t]he physical
characteristics of a person's voice, its tone and manner, . . . are con-
stantly exposed to the public. . . . No person can have a reasonable
expectation that others will not know the sound of his voice .... "69
Similarly, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Mara70 that hand-
writing exemplars were not protected under the fourth amendment be-
cause handwriting is also regularly exposed to the public. 71 In addition,
the Court has noted that fingerprinting "involves none of the probing
into an individual's private life and thoughts that marks [a] ...
search."72
64 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966).
65 In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Supreme Court stressed that a
search that went beyond the surface of the skin, such as a blood test, required a "clear indica-
tion" that the evidence sought would actually be obtained in the search. Id at 770. This
"clear indication" requirement seems to be a higher standard than probable cause. J. HALL,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 17:5, at 513-14 (1982).
66 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) ("[W]herever an individual may harbor a reason-
able 'expectation of privacy,'. . . he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion.") (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361).
67 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment provides
no protection for what 'a person knowingly exposes to the public ... ' ") (quoting Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
68 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
69 Id at 14.
70 410 U.S. 19 (1973).
71 Id at 21.
72 Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (reversing conviction where fingerprint
evidence was product of unlawful detention).
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In contrast, courts have found that taking blood tests,7 3 pubic hair
sampling,74 x-raying, 75 and the collection of fingernail scrapings76 con-
stitute searches under the fourth amendment. In these cases, the search
"went beyond mere 'physical characteristics . . . constantly exposed to
the public.' ,,77 In Schmerber v. Califomia, 78 the defendant had been ar-
rested for driving while intoxicated and the police directed a physician
to extract a blood sample over the defendant's protest. At trial, the de-
fendant objected to the admission of the chemical analysis made from
the sample, contending that the withdrawal of blood denied him his
fourth amendment right not to be searched without a warrant.79 The
Court found that the blood test "plainly involves the broadly conceived
reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment . . .[and
that] [s]uch testing procedures plainly constitute searches of 'persons'
• ..within the meaning of that Amendment."80
Given the "broadly conceived reach" of the fourth amendment, it is
not unreasonable to view a polygraph examination as a fourth amend-
ment "search." The responses recorded by polygraphs are too subtle to
be observed by the eye alone. Like blood tests, x-rays, and fingernail
scrapings, polygraph evidence is useful only after sophisticated process-
ing. The physiological responses measured by polygraphs are not "con-
stantly exposed to the public,"8' suggesting that it is reasonable for an
individual to expect privacy regarding these responses. 82 Furthermore,
an individual's feelings of excitement, embarrassment, shame, or anger83
are often extremely private, prompting reasonable expectations that
these emotions and the physiological responses they evoke will not be-
come public knowledge without consent. Because an individual can
reasonably expect privacy from the intrusion involved in a mandatory
polygraph examination, polygraph tests are properly characterized as
searches within the fourth amendment.
The conclusion that polygraph tests as contemplated by the Direc-
73 See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
74 See, e.g., Bouse v. Bussey, 573 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1977) (pubic hair). But cf. United
States v. D'Amico, 408 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1969) (scalp hair sample did not constitute search
because intrusion was so minor that seizure was reasonable).
75 See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 337 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
76 See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
77 Id at 295 (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973)).
78 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
79 Id at 758-59.
80 Id at 767. The Supreme Court affirmed Schmerber's conviction, however, because
the arresting officer "might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emer-
gency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened
'the destruction of evidence.' " Id at 770 (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367
(1964)).
81 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973).
82 J. HALL, supra note 65, § 17:3, at 512.
83 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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tive are searches for fourth amendment purposes must be measured fur-
ther against the Supreme Court's decision in Wman v. James,8 4 which
illustrates the Court's somewhat different attitude toward governmental
invasions in administrative contexts. InJames, the plaintiff, a recipient
of state Aid to Families with Dependent Children, challenged the state
requirement that caseworkers visit homes of recipients as a condition of
receiving assistance. The plaintiff contended that the mandatory visita-
tion was a search that violated her fourth amendment rights if not con-
sented to or supported by a search warrant. The Supreme Court, in a
five-to-four decision, 85 held that these home visits were not searches
under the fourth amendment because they were conducted for benevo-
lent rather than investigative purposes. Furthermore, the visits were not
forced and refusal to permit the intrusion was not subject to criminal
sanction.8 6 The Court noted that, if the aid recipient does not consent,
the visit does not occur and the aid "merely ceases."
8 7
Polygraph testing of federal employees differs substantially from
the home visits at issue injames, however, both in the nature and the
purpose of the governmental invasion. TheJames Court concluded that
the visits were not fourth amendment searches primarily because of
their benevolent, rehabilitative nature. The Court downplayed any in-
vestigative aspects of the visits and stated that the intrusion should not
be equated with the searches traditionally performed in connection with
criminal investigations. 88
Polygraph testing under the Directive is, however, exclusively in-
vestigative. The testing is intended to identify for sanctions those em-
ployees who have leaked classified information. In most cases, the
suspected leak implicates federal criminal laws,8 9 although the poly-
graph results cannot be used in a criminal prosecution against the tested
employee. 9° There is no suggestion that the testing is any way benevo-
lent or rehabilitative in nature.
The distinction between the benevolent nature of the visits in James
and the investigative nature of polygraph testing is clearly illustrated in
Rees v. Edmunds. 91 In Res, the district court concluded thatJames did
84 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
85 Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion, id at 326, as did Justice Marshall. Justice
Marshall's dissent was joined by Justice Brennan. Id at 338. Justice White dissented on the
fourth amendment issue, but concurred in the remainder of the majority's opinion. Id at
326.
86 Id at 317. Cf Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (fourth amendment
prohibits criminal prosecution for refusal to permit warrantless inspection); See v. City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (same).
87 400 U.S. at 317-18.
88 Id at 317.
89 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
90 See supra notes 11, 32 and accompanying text.
91 472 F. Supp. 1218 (D. Minn. 1979).
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not apply to home visits of welfare recipients by county welfare fraud
investigators. The Welfare Fraud Unit in R)es sent representatives to
recipients' homes to investigate complaints of fraud. If a welfare recipi-
ent refused to allow the investigators into his home, the aid would be
automatically terminated.92 The Reyes court distinguishedJames, find-
ing that the visits by the Welfare Fraud Unit were searches requiring a
warrant. As the court noted, "[t]his Unit was not engaged in social
work, but in police work" 93 regardless of "[w]hether or not the authori-
ties later chose to prosecute for infractions . . . .-94 Similarly, poly-
graph tests under the Directive are investigations targeted at criminal
activity, notwithstanding the government's choice to pursue administra-
tive rather than criminal sanctions.
As further support for its conclusion that the caseworker's visit fell
outside the scope of the fourth amendment, the James Court noted that
the intrusion was not "forced or compelled," and the denial of consent
was not criminally sanctioned.95 This reasoning has been sharply criti-
cized,96 because as Justice Marshall stated in his dissent, "there is
neither logic in, nor precedent for, the view that the ambit of the Fourth
Amendment depends not on the character of the governmental intru-
sion but on the size of the club that the State wields against a resisting
citizen." 97
TheJames Court's fourth amendment analysis has been criticized as
92 Id at 1225.
93 Id
94 Id
95 400 U.S. at 317.
96 See; e.g., I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4:12, at 262 (2d ed. 1978)
(concluding that under JAMES, "everyone's home may be subjected to a warrantless search if the
penalty for refusal is withdrawal of a benefit" because of the many governmental benefits
received by the public); Note, Wyman v. James: Welfare Home Visits and a Strict Construction of
the Fourth Amendment, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 714, 722 (1971) ("Merely to distinguish the home
visit from a criminal search and from an intrusion enforced by criminal penalty, does not
make the home visit any less a governmental intrusion upon the privacy protected by the
fourth amendment."). See generally Burt, Forcing Protection on Children and Their Parents.- The
Impact of Wyman v. James, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1259 (1971); Note, The Supreme Court, 1970
Term, 85 HARV. L. REv. 3, 258-69 (1971).
97 400 U.S. at 340-41. Justice Marshall pointed out that the criminal penalty in See v.
City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), was a $100 suspended fine but that the "penalty" for
refusing to consent to the visit in james was the loss of the sole means of support for the
plaintiff and her dependent child. Thus, the criminal sanction in See was actually far less
severe than the withdrawal of benefits in james. Id
Like the welfare recipient injames, federal employees ordered to take polygraph exami-
nations under the Directive can prevent the invasion by withholding consent. Thus, neither
invasion is absolutely compelled. Polygraph tests, however, are primarily investigative. In
this regard, they are similar to searches of licensed businesses, conducted by governmental
officials to ensure compliance with regulatory standards. Regulatory licenses, like welfare
payments, are benefits granted by the state. Searches of licensed businesses have been held to
require a warrant, see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. at 331, however, despite the fact that the
licensee could have avoided the search by relinquishing his license. The investigative nature
of license-connected searches, which require a warrant, seems far more analogous to poly-
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inconsistent with established precedent.98 Furthermore, the James Court
seemed to limit its analysis to the facts of the case 9 -- facts that are quite
distinguishable from the investigative polygraph examinations author-
ized by the Directive.'°° Thus, theJames decision does not alter the con-
clusion that the testing of federal employees as contemplated by the
Directive constitutes a fourth amendment search.
2. Interests Protected by the Fourth Amendment
The analysis does not end with the conclusion that a polygraph
examination is a fourth amendment "search." Warrantless polygraph
tests will violate fourth amendment rights only if they infringe on "an
interest which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect."' 01
Thus, it is necessary to define the scope of a federal employee's interest
invaded by a mandatory polygraph test.
Two underlying considerations should be highlighted in evaluating
graph examinations under the Directive than the more benevolent visits conducted by wel-
fare inspectors.
98 See James, 400 U.S. at 338-39 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
99 Id. at 326.
100 Thejames Court, after holding that the caseworker's visit was not a search, con-
cluded, apparently as dicta, that even if the visit were characterized as a search, it would not
be an unreasonable search, and thus would not be proscribed by the fourth amendment. Id
at 318. The Court based this conclusion on a variety of factors, including: the need to protect
the dependent child, the need to ensure that the aid is being used appropriately, the need to
effectuate the goals of the Aid to Dependent Children program, the reasonable means used in
conducting the visit, the benevolent nature of the visit, the lack of a criminal investigation,
and the difficulties that would be encountered if a warrant were required for all visits by
welfare personnel. Id at 318-24.
Polygraph testing of federal employees is readily distinguishable from these factors. The
testing is part of a quasi-criminal investigation that would not be undermined by requiring a
warrant based on probable cause. The goals of leak investigations could be attained by rely-
ing on secondary sources and traditional investigative techniques to assemble evidence suffi-
cient to support a warrant. The potentially indiscriminate use of polygraph testing differs
markedly from the helpful nature of the home visits emphasized by the Court injames.
101 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978). Rakas involved a police examination of a
locked glove compartment, an act that was admittedly a search. The Court found that in
order to decide "whether the challenged search .. . violated . .. Fourth Amendment
rights," it had to determine whether the search infringed on a protected interest. Id
In defining the scope of the petitioner's interest, the Rakas Court relied on Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which "held that capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth
Amendment depends. . . upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amend-
ment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." 439 U.S. at 143. The
Rakes Court's use of Kaaz suggests that defining the scope of protected fourth amendment
interests is analogous to determining whether an individual's expectation of privacy is "rea-
sonable" or "legitimate." Both approaches appear to call for a comparison of the relevant
individual and governmental interests. This Note proposes a similar balancing of governmen-
tal and private interests. See infa notes 118-42 and accompanying text.
The Rakas Court noted that an expectation of privacy is likely to exist where an in-
dividual has an ownership interest that allows him to exclude others from his property. Rakas
at 143-44 n. 12. This "right to exclude" is equally present in the context of polygraph exami-
nations, because generally an individual can exclude whomever he pleases from knowledge of
the nature and intensity of his emotions and the subtle physiological responses they produce.
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the scope of a public employee's rights. First, an individual does not
abandon all constitutional protections by accepting employment with
the government. 0 2 The second consideration is that the government
"has interests as an employer in regulating. . . its employees that differ
significantly from those it possessed in connection with regulation...
of the citizenry in general."' 0 3 Thus, a public employee's exercise of
constitutional rights may be limited to some degree by virtue of his
employment.
a. Lower Courts' Approach to Searches of Public Employees. In his con-
currence in Katz v. United States, 104 Justice Harlan articulated a two-step
test defining the scope of fourth amendment protection. Under
Harlan's test, establishing a fourth amendment claim requires "first that
a person [has] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to rec-
ognize as 'reasonable.' "o105 A number of courts faced with fourth
amendment disputes involving employee privacy have relied on
Harlan's test.10 6
For example, in United States v. Bunkers, 107 the Ninth Circuit held
that the search of a postal employee's locker was outside the scope of the
four amendment. In Bunkers, a union agreement advised all postal em-
ployees of the government's authority to search their lockers. The court
found that the agreement precluded employees from having a subjective
expectation that the contents of their lockers would remain private.
Without this subjective belief, the defendant employee did not have a
"reasonable" expectation of privacy. Therefore, the search of her locker
fell outside the protection of the fourth amendment. 108
102 See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1688-89 (1983) ("[T]he theory that public
employment. . . may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, [has]
been uniformly rejected."). This has not always been the case. For many years, it was be-
lieved that a public employee could be subject to any conditions of employment, "including
those which restricted the exercise of constitutional rights." Id at 1688. For a discussion of
the evolution of constitutional protections afforded public employees, see generally id at 1688-
89.
103 Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); see also Connick v. Myers, 103
S. Ct. 1684, 1687 (1983); Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
104 398 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
105 Id
106 See United States v. McIntyre, 582 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1978) (no regulation or prac-
tice to diminish Assistant Chief of Police's reasonable expectation that he would not be sub-
ject to electronic surveillance); Gillard v. Schmidt, 579 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978) (applying
Harlan's test without citing Katz in holding that school guidance counselor had reasonable
expectation that her desk would not be searched in absence of accepted practice or regulation
to contrary); see also infra note 108.
107 521 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 423 U.S. 989 (1975).
108 Id at 1219-21. The Third Circuit used the Bunkers analysis in a similar case but
concluded that the search was illegal. See United States v. Speights, 557 F.2d 362 (3d Cir.
1977). In Spezghts there were no departmental regulations or practices to put the defendant
on notice that his locker could be searched; the department allowed the use of personal locks
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The requirement that a person have an actual, subjective expecta-
tion of privacy has been strongly criticized, mainly because it begs the
question: An employee cannot subjectively expect privacy in an area if
the government has established a practice of conducting searches of that
area. 10 9 Thus, a majority of the Supreme Court in Smith v. Maylandl" 0
cautioned that the "subjective expectation of privacy" formula would
not be an adequate "index of Fourth Amendment protection" in all
situations. I I
Harlan's Katz formulation should not be applied to determine
whether polygraph tests fall within the scope of the fourth amendment.
Under Harlan's analysis, the notice provided by the Directive itself
would be sufficient to destroy the employee's subjective expectations of
privacy, thus precluding fourth amendment protection. This would be
an absurd result; the content of human thought and emotion is not
analogous to the content of a locker. A prudent employee will rid his
locker of its questionable contents upon receiving notice that the locker
may be searched, but an individual cannot rid his mind of its contents,
whether or not notice is given. Harlan's two part test, and the lower
court opinions that employ that test, are therefore not helpful in analyz-
ing the fourth amendment issues surrounding polygraph examinations.
b. Balancing Test. Given the inapplicability of Harlan's Katz for-
mulation to an assessment of fourth amendment protections for poly-
graph examinations, one must look elsewhere for an appropriate
on the lockers and permitted the employee police officers to keep personal belongings in their
lockers. The court concluded that the defendant officer had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy and thus was protected by the fourth amendment. Id The court distinguished its result
from similar cases, such as United States v. Bunkers, 521 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 989 (1975), United States v. Donato, 269 F. Supp. 921,aj'd, 379 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1967)
(locker search), and Shaffer v. Field, 339 F. Supp. 997 (C.D. Cal. 1972), afl'd, 484 F.2d 1196
(9th Cir. 1973) (same), by noting that those cases "all relied on specific regulations and prac-
tices in finding that an expectation of privacy was not reasonable. In [Speights], there [was]
no regulation and no police practice. . . shown which would alert an officer to expect uncon-
sented locker searches." 557 F.2d at 365.
109 .ee, e.g., Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974).
Professor Amsterdam commented:
An actual, subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place in a state-
ment of what Katz held or in a theory of what the fourth amendment pro-
tects. It can neither add to, nor can its absence detract from, an individual's
claim to fourth amendment protection. If it could, the government could
diminish each person's subjective expectation of privacy merely by announc-
ing half-hourly on television that . . . we were all forthwith being placed
under comprehensive electronic surveillance.
Id at 384.
110 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
111 Id at 740 n.5. According to Professor LaFave, the reasoning of the formula should be
avoided because "while it will frequently lead to the correct result, it distorts and unduly
limits the rule of the Katz case." 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2:1, at 230 (1978).
LaFave also points out that Harlan himself "came around" in United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting), where Harlan stated that a KATZ analysis
should "transcend the search for subjective expectations." 1 W. LAFAVE, supra, § 2:1, at 230.
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standard. Cases addressing the first amendment rights of public em-
ployees are helpful in formulating such a standard. These cases suggest
that courts, in assessing the scope of a public employee's first amend-
ment rights, must balance the employee's interest against the interest of
the government. As the Supreme Court indicated in Pickering v. Board of
Education, 112 the interest of the employee "in commenting upon matters
of public concern" must be balanced against the government's interest
"as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public service it per-
forms through its employees."' l1 3
In Connick v. Myers, 114 the Court considered the claim of an assistant
district attorney who alleged'1 5 that she had been fired for exercising her
right of free speech. Myers's supervisor had proposed her transfer to a
different section of the department. Myers strongly objected to the
transfer and distributed a questionnaire to co-workers regarding transfer
policy and other office practices. She was subsequently dismissed. In a
five-to-four opinion, the Court held that the supervisor had not violated
Myers's right to free speech.1 16 Both the majority and the dissenters in
Connick based their analysis on the Pickering balancing test. 117
The Court's use in Connick of a balancing approach to determine
permissible restrictions on a public employee's exercise of first amend-
ment rights suggests that courts might use a similar approach to analyze
fourth amendment protections provided public employees. Thus, to de-
termine whether the federal government may order an employee to sub-
mit to a polygraph test, one must balance the fourth amendment
interests of the employee with the government's interest in ordering the
test.
Polygraph examinations authorized by the Directive infringed
upon federal employees' interest in being protected against the "inva-
sion which [an unreasonable] search entails."' 18 Admittedly, the physi-
112 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
113 Id at 568.
114 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983).
115 The action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
116 103 S. Ct. at 1693-94.
117 Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1687, 1695 (1983). The crucial disagreement
among the members of the Court was whether Myers's speech addressed a matter of public
concern. Id at 1690, 1698. This factor was pivotal in the case because "speech on public
issues occupies the 'highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values,' and is entitled
to special protection." Id at 1689 (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.
886, 913 (1982)). Had the majority found that Myers's expression touched on public issues,
the importance of its first amendment protection would have outweighed the government's
interest in "effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public." Id at 1692.
The majority stated that Myers's speech was within the protection of the first amendment,
but because it was not highly protected speech involving a public concern, the Court would
not overrule a personnel decision by a public agency. Id at 1690, 1694. The majority did not
wish to "constitutionalize" what it perceived as an employee grievance. Id
118 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
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cal aspects of polygraph tests are only minimally intrusive."19 The
significant impact on the employee comes not only from the tangible,
physical intrusion of the polygraph, however, but also from its emo-
tional intrusiveness. 120
The polygraph's emotional intrusiveness stems from its ability to
"inflict great stress and emotional disturbance on the innocent and
guilty alike."'' 21 A federal employee has a strong interest in avoiding the
emotional invasion of a polygraph, an interest that directly implicates
the fourth amendment's "basic purpose to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
officials."1 22
The government's interest in administering warrantless polygraph
tests to its employees rests on its responsibility to protect the national
security by investigating and deterring leaks. 123 Courts traditionally ac-
cord great weight to national security interests 24 when balancing those
interests against individual rights, because "while the Constitution pro-
tects against invasions of individual rights, it does not withdraw from
the Government the power to safeguard its vital interests.' 25 The fact
that a national security interest may be involved does not end the dis-
119 See supra notes 37-39, 65 and accompanying text.
120 The emotional intrusiveness of a polygraph examination is important in evaluating
the employee's interests under the fourth amendment. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),
the Supreme Court evaluated a "stop and frisk" search by balancing the relevant governmen-
tal interests against the nature and quality of the search's intrusion upon the individual. The
Court's discussion of the intrusion concluded that even a brief frisk search is "an annoying,
frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience." Id. at 25. Similarly, in Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the Court considered both physical and psychological intrusions
resulting from random automobile searches in balancing an individual's interests against the
need for the search.
121 D. LYKKEN, supra note 10, at 215; see also supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
122 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
123 Classified information is information that "reasonably could be expected to cause
damage to the national security if disclosed." Exec. Order No. 12,356, § l.1(a)(3), 3 C.F.R.
166, 167 (1983). Thus, any leak implicates the government's interest in protecting national
security, because a leak is an unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
124 Critics of the Directive question whether the national security problem that the Di-
rective purports to address does in fact exist. See, e.g., Directive Hearings, supra note 11, at 5
(statement of Bruce Sanford, Society of Professional Journalists) (noting "disturbing" lack of
evidence that national security is being injured by leaks); Id at 1 (statement of Rep. Mel
Levine) ("[T]here is no indication of any instances in which our national security interests
have recently been compromised as a result of unauthorized leaks by. . . government em-
ployees."). Furthermore, questions have been raised about whether all the information that is
classified actually would threaten the national security if disclosed. See, e.g., Directive Hearings,
id. at 3 (statement of Bruce Sanford, Society of Professional Journalists); see also Cheh, supra
note 12.
The integrity of the classification system and the need for the Directive are beyond the
scope of this Note. This Note will assume for the purposes of argument that the national
security actually is jeopardized to some degree by unauthorized disclosures of classified
information.
125 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267 (1967).
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cussion, however. As the Supreme Court noted in United States v.
Robel, 126 "this concept of 'national defense' cannot be deemed an end in
itself, justifying any exercise of. . .power designed to promote such a
goal."1
2 7
The government's interest in protecting national security is less
weighty in the case of polygraph examinations because that interest is
not harmed by requiring a warrant prior to an examination in conform-
ance with fourth amendment protections. As the Supreme Court stated
in Camara v. Municipal Court: 128
The final justification suggested for warrantless administrative
searches is that the public interest demands such a rule. . . .But we
think this argument misses the mark. The question is not, at this stage
at least, whether these inspections may be made, but whether they
may be made without a warrant. . . . In assessing whether the pub-
lic interest demands creation of a general exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement, the question is not whether the
public interest justifies the type of search in question, but whether the
authority to search should be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn
depends in part upon whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is
likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search ...
It has nowhere been urged that [this search] could not achieve [its]
goals within the confines of a reasonable search warrant requirement.
Thus, we do not find the public need argument dispositive. 129
The reasoning in Camara is equally applicable to polygraph searches.
National security is not jeopardized by the requirement that the govern-
ment demonstrate cause and obtain a warrant before subjecting one of
its employees to a search. Polygraph evidence is not evanescent, 130 and
thus the "burden of obtaining a warrant" is unlikely "to frustrate the
governmental purpose behind the search."' 13 1
The reasonableness of a search depends at least partially on the
effectiveness of the investigative technique employed. For example, in
126 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
127 Id at 264. Robel involved a statute passed pursuant to Congress's war power, which
abridged the appellee's first amendment right of free association. The Court held that the
statute was overbroad, and that the fact that the statute was passed under the war power to
further national defense could not remove constitutional safeguards of essential liberties. Id.
at 264-65.
128 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Camara involved warrantless searches of private residences by
municipal housing inspectors.
129 Id at 533 (citation omitted).
130 Evanescent evidence is evidence that is likely to disappear or dissipate and thus falls
under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Cupp v.
Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (holding that traces of blood, skin, and other materials under
defendant's nails was highly evanescent evidence, which justified limited warrantless search
required to preserve it); see also supra note 80.
131 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
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Schmerber v. California, 132 the Court noted that a blood test was a reason-
able method for analyzing blood-alcohol levels, because "[e]xtraction of
blood samples for testing is a highly effective means of determining the
degree to which a person is under the influence of alcohol." 133 In con-
trast, the Court in Delaware v. Prouse'3 4 considered the legality of stop-
ping and searching randomly selected automobiles and concluded that
"[i]n terms of [meeting the governmental interest in discovering and de-
terring unlicensed drivers], the spot check does not appear sufficiently
productive to qualify as a reasonable law enforcement practice under
the Fourth Amendment." 135 The Prouse Court noted that the additional
governmental interest in ensuring compliance with state automobile
registration did not necessitate stopping vehicles, because improperly
registered vehicles could be identified by their failure to display the ap-
propriate license plates. 136 In addition, the Court doubted that spot
checks would further deter unlicensed drivers who were already faced
with the possibility of being caught after a traffic violation.137 Thus, the
"spot check" search was not a "sufficiently productive mechanism" to
allow intrusion upon fourth amendment interests. 38
Polygraph examinations suffer a similar defect, both in their capac-
ity to discern deception accurately and in their ability to deter future
leaks. The personal invasion that a polygraph search necessarily entails
is not justified in light of its questionable accuracy. 139 Although al-
lowing warrantless polygraph tests might deter some disclosures, the de-
terrent effect is likely to be minimal given the substantial criminal
penalties for unauthorized disclosures that already exist. 140 Further-
more, as the Office of Technology Assessment pointed out, "those indi-
viduals who the Federal Government would most want to detect (e.g.,
for legitimate national security violations) may well be the most moti-
vated and perhaps the best trained to avoid detection [through the use
of countermeasures].' 14 1 The polygraph's potential for inculpating the
innocent and exculpating the guilty indicates that it is not a "sufficiently
productive mechanism to justify the intrusion upon Fourth Amendment
interests"'142 that such tests entail.
In sum, a public employee's interest in avoiding the emotional and
132 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
133 Id at 771.
134 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
135 Ma at 660.
136 d
137 Id
138 Id at 659.
139 See su1ira notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
140 See, e.g., supra note 28.
141 Directive Hearings, supra note 11, at 7-11 (statement of Dr. John H. Gibbons, Director,
Office of Technology Assessment ).
142 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979).
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physical invasion of a polygraph test outweighs the government's inter-
est in maintaining security, at least where that security is to be protected
by a procedure of questionable effectiveness. This conclusion is particu-
larly compelling because a warrant requirement would protect an em-
ployee's interests and yet would allow the government to achieve its
objectives. The warrant serves solely as a check on the discretionary use
of polygraphs.
B. The Warrant Requirement
A warrant requirement is vital to the protection of employee inter-
ests from the unrestricted discretion to order polygraph examinations
granted to agency heads under the Directive. Such "standardless and
unconstrained discretion is the evil the Court has discerned when in pre-
vious cases it has insisted that the discretion of the official in the field be
circumscribed, at least to some extent."' 143 The remaining issue involves
the standards under which a magistrate may properly issue a warrant
authorizing a polygraph examination of a federal employee.
Courts have uniformly applied an objective standard to determine
whether sufficient cause exists to issue a warrant. 144 The government
must base its warrant request on factual evidence, not mere conclu-
sions. 145 Therefore, at a minimum, an agency head seeking a warrant to
subject an employee to a polygraph test must present some quantum of
objective, factual evidence to support the issuance of a warrant.
Depending upon the nature of the search or seizure, the Supreme
Court has applied various tests to determine the level of cause needed to
issue a warrant and the evidence necessary to support that standard of
cause. These tests include: (1) the traditional "probable cause" test used
in criminal search and arrest cases; (2) the test used in Schmerber v. Califor-
nia, 146 which requires "clear indication" that the evidence sought would
in fact be found in searches entailing a physical intrusion into the sub-
ject's body; 14 7 and (3) the Camara v. Municipal Court test, 14 which bal-
ances the invasion involved in the search against the need for
undertaking the invasion.
The Camara balancing test provides the most appropriate warrant
143 Id at 661.
144 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
145 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112-13 (1964) (mere conclusions insufficient to justify
issuance of warrant). In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949), the Supreme
Court concluded that probable cause means "more than bare suspicion."
146 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (warrantless withdrawal of blood sample by physician to test
for intoxication constitutional under exigency exception).
147 Id at 772.
148 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (warrantless building inspection violated fourth amendment); see
also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (using Camara balancing test in determining level of
cause needed to conduct "stop and frisk" search).
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standard for polygraph examinations authorized by the Directive. Be-
cause the polygraph examinations are not conducted as part of a crimi-
nal prosecution, 49 the rigor of the traditional probable cause standard
associated with criminal proceedings is not suitable. Similarly, the phys-
ical invasion accompanying a polygraph examination is not a sufficient
bodily intrusion to merit the use of the "clear indication" test. The
Camara test is particularly useful when applied outside the usual context
of criminal investigations and arrests because it provides "a flexible
standard, permitting consideration of . . . public and individual
interests." 50
In Camara, the appellant was arrested after he refused to allow a
housing inspector to search his residence without a warrant. The
Supreme Court held that a warrant was required to conduct the inspec-
tion 15' and went on to consider the standard under which such a war-
rant could be issued. The Court concluded that the appropriate
standard could be determined by "balancing the need to search against
the invasion which the search entails." 52 Under this approach, the
Court found that an amount of evidence less than that required by the
traditional probable cause test was constitutionally necessary for the in-
spector to obtain a warrant for the type of administrative search in-
volved in Camara.
The Camara Court distinguished routine housing inspections from
searches that seek the "fruits and instrumentalities" of criminal activity,
concluding that an individual's interest in avoiding an invasion is less
weighty when an inspection is involved. 153 Polygraph tests under the
Directive are not part of a criminal prosecution; instead the government
proposes to use the tests under threat of administrative sanctions.' 54
The warrant standard may therefore be lower than the "probable
cause" standard commonly used in criminal investigations. Although
the agencies applying the tests do not seek criminal evidence, the test
results may be used to effect consequences more severe than the conse-
quences associated with a routine housing inspection. Unlike a housing
inspection, the employee faces serious job sanctions under the
Directive.155
The foregoing discussion suggests that a reasonable warrant stan-
dard for polygraph examinations of federal employees would require a
149 Polygraph test results are generally inadmissible in criminal proceedings, see supra
note 11, and the fifth amendment bars the use in subsequent criminal proceedings of any
admissions obtained in questioning, see supra note 32.
150 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 111, § 10.1, at 190.
151 387 U.S. at 540.
152 Id at 537.
153 Id at 538.
154 See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
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showing of cause less than the probable cause necessary for an arrest,
but greater than the level of cause required for a routine housing inspec-
tion. An appropriate standard was suggested in Delaware V. Prouse, 156 a
case involving searches conducted on randomly stopped automobiles.
In Prouse, the Supreme Court used the Camara balancing test, holding
that searches of randomly stopped vehicles violate the fourth amend-
ment in the absence of "individualized, articulable suspicion. . . pursu-
ant to previously specified 'neutral criteria.' "157 Under this standard,
an agency head seeking a warrant under the Directive would be re-
quired to show objective evidence implicating the specific individual to
be tested. Such a standard would permit the government to conduct a
polygraph test when supported by objective, articulable facts, but would
protect employees from "dragnet" testing or testing conducted at the
whim of their agency heads.
Camara suggests that courts should apply a balancing test to deter-
mine the amount of evidence necessary to support a polygraph warrant.
Thus, cases like Prouse indicate only a range of evidence necessary to
support a warrant under the Directive. The exact quantum of evidence
required, although falling within that range, would not be uniform but
would vary somewhat from case to case in accord with Camara s flexible
standard.
Camara-s balancing test requires an evaluation of individual and
governmental interests similar to the analysis used above to determine
that the fourth amendment applies to mandatory polygraph examina-
tions. 158 These interests will be reconsidered briefly to determine the
proper standard for issuing a warrant authorizing a polygraph test.
A polygraph examination constitutes a physical and psychological
invasion of the subject.' 59 The test is a subtle form of interrogation,
with all the accompanying anxieties of "being on the hot-seat."
The invasion accompanying a polygraph test must be balanced
against the government's need to conduct the examination. The agency
head who requests a warrant has as his primary goal the identification
and sanction of employees who have made unauthorized disclosures of
classified information. Polygraph testing may make only a small contri-
bution towards attaining this goal, however, because the inaccuracies of
the test make the evidence obtained highly suspect. Nonetheless, the
polygraph may be one component of the government's investigation.
Agency heads requesting warrants to conduct polygraph examina-
tions under the Directive must present concrete evidence implicating the
156 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
157 Id at 662.
158 See supra notes 118-42 and accompanying text for discussion of individual and govern-
mental interests.
159 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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employee to be examined. The amount of evidence needed will always
be less than that required by the traditional probable cause test used in
criminal cases, but will vary in accord with the government's need to
conduct the examination.
IV
REMEDIES
A. Equitable Relief
The exclusionary rule, a common "remedy" for persons subject to
unconstitutional searches, applies principally to criminal trials. 60 Thus,
absent a criminal prosecution for leaking information, the exclusionary
rule will not provide relief for an aggrieved federal employee. 161 None-
theless, if pursuant to the Directive an agency head who has not ob-
tained a warrant orders a federal employee either to submit to a
polygraph test or face demotion or transfer, 62 the employee will desire
relief and may turn to the federal courts to enforce constitutional protec-
tions. For example, the employee may seek declaratory and injunctive
relief on behalf of himself and others similarly situated.
Federal courts have traditionally enjoined federal officials when
their conduct threatens constitutionally protected rights. 63 Courts hesi-
tate, however, to issue injunctions based solely on a "single nonrecurring
instance"'1 of allegedly unconstitutional activity. Thus, in order to ob-
tain an injunction, a federal employee threatened with a polygraph ex-
amination must allege an infringement of fourth amendment rights and
demonstrate a substantial risk of future violations.165
In Long v. District of Columbia, 166 the court refused to grant an in-
160 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 111, § 1.5, at 83.
161 A federal employee could use the exclusionary rule in a subsequent administrative
hearing to fire the employee. Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See generaly 1
W. LAFAvE, supra note 111, § 1.5(e).
162 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
163 See, e.g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) ("[I]t is established practice for this
Court to sustain the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue injunctions to protect rights safe-
guarded by the Constitution. . . .'). The courts' power to enjoin does not stem from any
statutory authorization, but from the Constitution itself. Id at 684-85.
For many years the Supreme Court was reluctant to find a legal cause of action for
damages in the absence of statutory authorization where a federal official had violated some-
one's constitutional rights. See, e.g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). An injunction, how-
ever, is an equitable remedy; as such, the courts could provide relief regardless of statutory
authorization.
The Court has since found a legal action for damages in the absence of a statutory provi-
sion. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that violation
by federal agents of fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures gave rise to direct cause of action for damages).
164 Long v. District of Columbia, 469 F.2d 927, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
165 See, e.g., id
166 467 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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junction where the plaintiff had alleged isolated instances of unconstitu-
tional warrantless searches. The Long court denied relief because it
found no substantial risk of future violations. The court noted, however,
that such a risk would exist where there is an official, publicly adopted
policy "of inflicting searches which, when tested, are unlawful."' 167 Such
a policy leaves no question that the unconstitutional procedures are reg-
ular, recurring practices. 168 The Directive explicitly establishes such a
policy and thus demonstrates the substantial risk of future violations.
Under the reasoning of Long, if a federal court concluded that
mandatory polygraph examinations violate employees' fourth amend-
ment rights, an injunction prohibiting warrantless searches under the
Directive would be appropriate.
In addition to injunctive relief, an aggrieved employee can request
a declaration from the court establishing that a federal agency desiring
to order a polygraph test of the employee must obtain a warrant before
conducting the examination. 69 Federal courts may grant a declaratory
judgment in favor of any party with standing, 70 provided an actual
controversy exists between parties with adverse legal interests.17 An ac-
tion for injunctive and declaratory relief brought by a federal employee
threatened with a warrantless polygraph test under the Directive would
clarify the rights of federal workers regarding such tests and would re-
solve the issues discussed in this Note.
B. Legal Relief: The Bivens Action
A less useful remedy for an employee subject to a warrantless poly-
graph search is an action for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents. 172 In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that a violation of the
fourth amendment by federal agents gave rise to a cause of action for
damages. Under Bivens, the aggrieved employee could sue an agency
167 Id at 932.
168 Id
169 In federal court, a declaratory judgment would be requested under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 57 and the Declaratory judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976).
170 The general principles of standing apply to declaratory judgment suits. At a mini-
mum, article III of the Constitution requires a plaintiff to show "injury in fact" resulting from
the challenged activity. Other decisions look for a connection between the asserted injury
and the protective purpose of the relevant constitutional provision, and where "the injury
asserted involves an interest that was intended to be protected, standing exists." 13 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531, at 176-77
(1975). Federal employees seeking a declaratory judgment to establish that the Directive
violates their fourth amendment rights would have standing under either standard. Cf. Seat-
tle School Dist. No. I v. Washington, 633 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980) (plaintiffs had standing to
challenge constitutionality of specific statute by declaratory judgment suit where enforcement
was threatened against parties whose legal interests were identical to those of plaintiffs).
171 10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2757
(2d ed. 1983).
172 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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head for money damages for injuries caused by the warrantless poly-
graph examination. 173
A federal employee sued in a Bivens action, however, can escape
liability if he can prove "not only that he believed, in good faith, that
his conduct was lawful, but also that his belief was reasonable." 1 74 If the
challenged polygraph test was ordered by the agency head after a federal
court had issued a declaratory judgment that such testing requires a
warrant in order to be constitutionally permissible, then the agency
head could not claim that he reasonably believed that a warrantless or-
der was lawful. On the other hand, a Bivens suit brought before such a
judicial determination may be unsuccessful. A federal agent's reliance
on a regulation as it existed at the time of the search has been construed
to constitute reasonable belief in the search's lawfulness. 175
The possibility that a governmental official may have some immu-
nity for actions taken in the course of performing his official duties may
also create obstacles for a plaintiff in a Bivens action. In Butz v. Econo-
mou, 176 the Supreme Court recognized that a qualified immunity may
protect a federal official in suits for damages arising from unconstitu-
tional actions. This immunity, however, is not absolute.177
In Barr v. Mateo, 178 the Supreme Court stated that an official is im-
mune when he performs "discretionary acts at those levels of govern-
ment where the concept of duty encompasses the sound exercise of
discretionary authority" and where the act complained of is "within the
outer perimeter of [the official's] line of duty." 179 The directive clearly
gave agency heads the discretion to order polygraph tests.' 80 Where the
agency head orders a test in the course of investigating a leak, the offi-
cial's actions fall within his "line of duty" under the Directive. The im-
munity of federal officials may therefore pose a problem in some Bivens
actions. In cases involving clear abuse of discretion, however, the poly-
graph order may not be within the limits of the official's line of duty,
and thus official immunity will not apply. In any event, an employee
seeking damages under Bivens for an unconstitutional polygraph exami-
nation will have to establish that a qualified immunity does not protect
the agency head ordering the test.
173 See generally I W. LAFAvE, supra note 111, § 1.8(b).
174 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1348 (2d Cir. 1972).
175 See Morales v. Hamilton, 391 F. Supp. 85, 89 (D. Ariz. 1975) (officer had good reason
to rely on state of law at time in conducting border search).
176 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
177 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978) (federal officials entitled only to
qualified immunity); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974) (qualified immunity's
availability depends on scope of discretion and responsibilities).
178 360 U.S. 564 (1949).
179 Id at 575.
180 See supra text at notes 20-21.
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CONCLUSION
National Security Decision Directive 84 seriously threatened the
privacy and dignity of the four million people 8 1 who under the Direc-
tive could have been ordered to submit to polygraph tests at the unbri-
dled discretion of governmental officials. In constructing future
approaches to leak investigations, federal policymakers must realize that
although the Directive's approach may have addressed important na-
tional security interests by attempting to deter leaks of classified infor-
mation, those interests cannot justify standardless discretion which
jeopardizes federal employees' constitutional rights. In order to subject
a federal employee to the physical and emotional invasion of a poly-
graph examination, the fourth amendment requires that a federal offi-
cial obtain a warrant. A warrant can be issued upon a showing of
"individualized, articulable suspicion" that the particular employee has
knowledge of a leak. Such a showing will in no way weaken the govern-
ment's ability to protect national security, but it will give federal em-
ployees the assurance that they will not be searched without cause. The
fourth amendment has always stood as a fortress against arbitrary inva-
sions by the federal government. Its protection must extend to federal
employees who are subjected to polygraph examinations under standar-
dless, discretionary orders.
Julia K Craig
181 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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